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Abstract
Individual agency observed in the gendered division of labor is
shaped by structural factors, but only recently has evidence
emerged that the effect of women’s resources varies systematically
in its sociopolitical context. Here we use the 1994 International
Social Survey Program to assess whether the relative effect of a
proxy for women’s and men’s preferences—hallmark of individual
choice—varies as well across three countries with divergent histori-
cal policy approaches regarding the private sphere. East German
socialist policies required and supported women’s employment;
West German policy promulgated a male breadwinner model, and
U.S. policy primarily remains silent on the private sphere. The divi-
sion of domestic tasks and relative strength of individual prefer-
ences on shifting it vary by region. In the former East Germany the
division of domestic labor is more egalitarian and the effect of pref-
erences is small but equal for the genders. In West Germany
the division is more traditional and preference effects are greater,
but gender differences in these are insignificant. The U.S. division
of domestic task falls between the two German regions, and the
gender difference in preference effects is the greatest, with U.S.
men’s preferences predicting significantly more variance than do
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U.S. women’s. Consequently, allowing the market to dominate
does not yield equal strength of preferences in the individual-level
models used to predict the division of domestic tasks. This supports
the dual-system feminist claims that capitalism can exacerbate non-
market patriarchal hierarchies.
Introduction
Central to shaping gender relations within a society is the extent
to which the labor market and the state reinforce the traditional gen-
dered division of labor, where the man is the primary breadwinner
while the woman specializes in the domestic sphere. Neoclassical
economists (Becker 1981; Mincer and Polachek 1974) and some
sociologists (Durkheim 1984 [1893]; Hakim 2000, 2003; Parsons
1942) contend that the gendered division of labor is an optimal allo-
cation of family time, based on women’s lower labor market returns
and preferences for domestic tasks.
As to the market causes, the gender wage gap across countries
remains real and persistent even after controlling for differences in
education and experience (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2002; Blau and
Kahn 1996; Gornick 1999). Despite women’s lower returns, their
labor force participation has steadily increased across industrialized
countries, along with their relative economic equality in the house-
hold (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2002; Sorensen and McLanahan 1986).
Across countries, the increase in men’s share of unpaid domestic work
and child care, however, has not been commensurate (Blossfeld and
Drobnic 2001; Gershuny 2000).
Hakim (2000) claims that the gendered division of labor remains
because modern society now provides women with more choices due
to five historical changes: (1) the contraceptive revolution; (2) the
equal opportunities revolution ensuring women have access to all
positions, occupations, and careers; (3) expansion of white-collar
occupations that are more attractive to women; (4) growth of the
secondary job market providing part-time employment; and (5) the
increasing importance of preferences in shaping lifestyle choices
(Hakim 2003, 7). She argues that these changes have led to an
increasing heterogeneity among women as to their preferences for
market versus domestic work.
Because of this heterogeneity among women, women as a group
do not support a single set of policies that affect the division of labor
so that we do not observe any substantial change in its gendered
nature (Hakim 2000). The two smallest groups, which she claims
comprise about 20 percent each of a given population, consist of
women who are the most traditional and most nontraditional.
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Women with traditional preferences support any policies reinforcing
the male breadwinner model so that they might devote themselves to
the domestic sphere, whereas women with the most nontraditional
preferences support any policies reinforcing their greater competi-
tiveness in the labor market. Hakim argues that the majority of
women lies between the two, at times supporting male breadwinner
policies and at times supporting dual-earner policies, depending on
their current needs across the life course. Given their historical full-
time employment, men are more homogeneous in their preferences
for full-time paid employment and policy support thereof (Hakim
2000).
There is a fundamental flaw in the logic of Hakim’s argument. She
ignores the extent to which the first four crucial changes are truly
accessible to women and, in turn, constrain the fifth regarding their
choice of lifestyle. Taking a structuralist rather than the individual
agency approach Hakim uses, many argue that nonmarket hierar-
chies reinforce the gendered division of paid labor and are therefore
the cause, not the outcome, of its existence. Early theorizing on this
issue came from dual-systems feminists who claim that patriarchy
exists, reflecting a hierarchical relation where women are subordi-
nate to men in a gender-ordered division of labor in addition to the
wage-ordered system (Eisenstein 1981; Hartmann 1979, 1981b;
Walby 1990). Hartmann (1981b, 18) argues, “Capitalist develop-
ment creates places for a hierarchy of workers, but . . . [g]ender and
racial hierarchies determine who fills the empty places,” thereby
structuring the observed occupational gender segregation and wage
differentials (Hartmann 1979). It is advantageous for men to main-
tain this division, as they get greater control over economic resources
and more time in leisure pursuits (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2002;
Gershuny 2000).
Unlike the division of labor, however, it is difficult to find mea-
sures of patriarchy. But as it reflects the nonmarket presence of male
dominance, the extent of its possible existence might be assessed by
the extent to which nonmarket variables account for the division of
domestic labor. To wit, while Becker (1981) and Hakim (2000,
2003) imply it is women’s preferences for domestic tasks that result
in their continued responsibility for them, it is possible that the
household division of labor reflects men’s preferences opposed to
unpaid domestic work and that men’s preferences dominate in a
patriarchal society.
One way to ascertain whether it is individual preferences or an
institutional and possibly patriarchal structure that is reflected in
gender relations is to assess whether, controlling for relative
economic resources, men’s preferences are more important than
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women’s in predicting the household time allocated to unpaid
domestic tasks. If women’s preferences are significant predictors of
the reported division of domestic labor, this would support Hakim’s
contention that the gendered division of domestic labor reflects
women’s choice, although it does not eliminate the likelihood that
the range of choices is socially constructed. If men’s preferences pre-
dict more of the division of domestic labor than women’s, this sug-
gests there might be some element of patriarchal dominance beyond
that derived from material relations.
Most U.S. studies find that men’s gender ideology is more strongly
associated with the division of domestic tasks than is women’s, but in
either case, attitudes account for very little variation in the division
of labor (Shelton and John 1996). Fuwa (2004), using the United
Nations’s Gender Empowerment Measure,1 finds that the effect of
women’s gender ideology is stronger or weaker for women in more
versus less egalitarian countries, respectively. Yet to date no one has
assessed whether policy alters the relative strength of women’s versus
men’s ideology in predicting the division of housework.
Here, data from the 1994 International Social Survey Program are
used to compare to what extent women’s and men’s relative eco-
nomic resources and gender ideology—used as a proxy for prefer-
ences—predict the division of unpaid labor in three regions providing
contrasts in terms of policy impact on the private sphere: East and
West Germany and the United States. The specific policy contrasts
will be outlined in the next section, along with their hypothesized
effects on the division of labor. The models and data are presented in
the third section, with results presented in the fourth. The final sec-
tion concludes.
The State and the Gendered Division of Labor
The family exists in a policy context, with policies varying by the
extent to which there are gendered inequalities in employment and
the value of paid work, as well as the nature and value of entitle-
ments (O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993). States vary in the degree to
which they reinforce a woman’s responsibility for unpaid care work
in the home and her economic dependence on a male breadwinner
(Lewis 1992) or mitigate her economic dependence, most frequently
by enabling her to become integrated into the labor force (Hobson
1990).
The former East and West Germany enable us to compare the
effect of radically different policies on people who share a common
cultural past. At the end of World War II, five Länder separated to
form East Germany, while the remaining formed West Germany.
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West Germany founded a new political system based on “natural
law” (Naturrecht), stemming from a “pre-political” patriarchal
order “ordained by God” (Moeller 1993). Social provisions favoring
male breadwinners with nonworking wives were promulgated during
the 1950s and 1960s under Konrad Adenauer (Gerhard 1992; Ostner
1992; Zimmerman 1993). Various tax provisions were introduced,
such as income splitting, that proved particularly beneficial to high-
income, single-earner families. Mothers were deemed the only satis-
factory educators of their children (von Oertzen 1999), so in the
1960s public schools were set up with varying daily schedules and
were closed over the lunch hour (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997;
Ostner 1993).
Fewer West German women than men graduated from the highest
secondary school tracks; fewer still went on to university (Geschka
1989). The German educational system is highly stratified, with most
students going on to some type of vocational education in lieu of uni-
versity, yet there are clear gender differences in the type of occupa-
tional training selected (Geschka 1989). A 1966 federal report
highlighted gender disparities in educational attainment and con-
cluded that West German women’s lack of educational pursuits were
proving detrimental not to their employment prospects but to the
education of their children (von Oertzen 1999).
In contrast, East Germany adopted a Stalinist constitution in 1949
that enforced women’s obligation to work (Budde 1999; Moeller
1993; Trappe 2000). According to socialist doctrine, women’s oppres-
sion is a function of capitalist social relations (Marx 1967). Therefore,
the removal of women’s economic dependence presumably eliminates
gender subjugation. To support maternal employment, East Germany
passed the 1950 Mother and Child Care and Women’s Rights Acts,
establishing a network of public child care centers, kindergartens, and
facilities for free school meals, maternity leave, and days off to care for
sick children (Ostner 1993; Zimmerman 1993). The state also man-
dated developing the skill credentials of women through education and
vocational training (Budde 1999; Korn et al. 1984). A larger propor-
tion of East German women attended professional colleges and univer-
sity than in West Germany, although East German women still
overwhelmingly selected just sixteen, traditionally female vocational
tracks out of the hundreds available to them (Nickel 1992).
The East German pronatalist policies assumed women’s responsi-
bility for the domestic sphere, however, so maternity leaves, missed
days caring for sick children, and the like were extra costs of female
employees, with gender employment and earnings differences persist-
ing (Einhorn 1993; Ferree 1992; Nickel 1992). The 1965 Family
Law Code (Familiengesetzbuch) emphasized the equality of spouses
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and demanded a new male consciousness in child care and child-rearing,
but no policies were implemented to support the rhetoric (Budde
1999; Zimmerman 1993).
The United States has similarities and differences with both German
regions. The West German and U.S. welfare regimes are based on the
principle of subsidiarity, where the family and nonstate institutions
are primarily responsible for individual welfare (Esping-Andersen
1990; Ostner 1992). But West German policy explicitly relies on
women’s unpaid care work, whereas U.S. policy is essentially silent
on the private sphere (Leibfried and Ostner 1991). As a liberal wel-
fare regime, the United States encourages market participation but
also relies on the market to supply any support for maternal employ-
ment (Gauthier 1996; Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997). Within the
United States, religious beliefs are important as in West Germany,
but a legal separation of church and state has limited religion’s direct
policy effects to primarily those concerning women’s access to abor-
tion, although this particular issue is so contested that it has become
a regular platform for U.S. presidential candidates.
Since World War II, U.S. policy has primarily reflected the liberal
tradition and addressed women’s ability to compete in the labor mar-
ket.2 U.S. women activists disagreed, however, as to whether policy
should acknowledge gender difference, as in West Germany, or pro-
mote gender employment equality, as in East Germany (Costain
1992; Stetson 1995). A cornerstone piece of legislation addressed gen-
der equality: employment, training, and education discrimination on
the basis of gender became illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. During the 1970s, laws expanded enforcement of this
legislation, promoting equal educational opportunities and job train-
ing. During the same period, policies acknowledging gender differ-
ence were also passed, including provisions for unpaid maternity
leave rights, tax deductions for child care expenses for working par-
ents, and women’s right to control their reproduction (Costain 1992).
The influence of policy on the division of paid labor is evident in
the relative 1990 married female labor force participation levels
across the three regions. At the time of German reunification in
1990, over 90 percent of married women in the former East Germany
were employed, almost 70 percent full-time, as compared with just
44 percent of married women in the west, only half of whom were
employed full-time (Ostner 1993). The net wages of East German
women working full-time were 76 percent of men’s (Nickel 1992), as
compared with 65 percent for West German women working full-
time (Frevert 1989; Gornick 1999). The United States passed some
equal employment policies, as did East Germany (although in neither
region was gender equality in employment achieved), but as in
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West Germany, the United States provided few social provisions to
support maternal employment. By 1990, U.S. married women’s
employment was at 58 percent, 60 percent of whom were employed
full-time,3 and the U.S. women’s relative wage was 72 percent of
men’s (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2002), figures roughly midway
between those for East and West German women.
Because these policy differences affect women’s labor force partic-
ipation levels and their relative economic resources, we would expect
the aggregate division of domestic labor to be most egalitarian in
East Germany, most traditional in West Germany, and somewhere in
between in the United States. Any variation not accounted for by
relative economic resources is a function of, taking the agentic line,
individual preferences and/or, taking the structuralist line, patriar-
chal constraints. If these preferences are not socially constructed,
then their relative importance should be similar across the genders
and sociopolitical contexts.
If, however, a patriarchal structure results from capitalist relations
as suggested by Marx, both East German men and women should
hold the most nontraditional gender ideology, and neither should
predict a greater variance in the division of domestic tasks. At the
other extreme of capitalist development lies the United States, where
one would expect relative economic resources to be significantly
more important. At the same time, Eisenstein (1981) and Hartmann
(1979, 1981b) claim that capitalism exacerbates patriarchy, so
within this context, U.S. men’s preferences should prove more signif-
icant than women’s. In contrast, West German policy explicitly rein-
forced the male breadwinner model and women’s responsibility for
the domestic sphere, so ideology should be important when predict-
ing the division of domestic labor. But given that separate roles were
explicitly reinforced by the West German sociopolitical context, it is
unclear whether men’s preferences will prove more important than
women’s.
Methods and Data
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is a continuing
annual program of cross-national research collaboration that utilizes
preexisting social science projects and coordinates research goals in
twenty-six countries.4 The 1994 module is the second on Family and
Changing Gender Roles; the first was conducted in 1988. While both
modules contain questions regarding gender roles and employment,
only the 1994 module asks respondents about who does the domestic
tasks. In addition, only the 1994 module contains East German
respondents. There has been a more recent fielding of the survey in
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2002, but this would include East German couples who have lived a
significant length of time under both German policy contexts. There-
fore, the 1994 ISSP data are used to assess whether gender ideology,
as a proxy for preferences, predicts the division of household labor
beyond that predicted by relative economic resources.
The terms “gender ideology” and “preferences” are being used
interchangeably. Hakim (1991) has argued that the types of attitudi-
nal data used to derive measures of gender ideology are poor mea-
sures of preferences, in that people do not necessarily accept
generalizations as applying to their own particular cases. Yet she
acknowledges that there are at least weak associations between such
attitudinal data and observed behavior. Further, others have found
that gender ideology scales constructed from attitude questions iden-
tical to those within the data used here are significant predictors of
the U.S. division of domestic labor (see Shelton and John 1996 for a
review), so it seems plausible that they will prove significant predic-
tors in other societies. In addition, while there might be some ques-
tion of validity when using such data to derive a measure of
preferences, the interest here is not in an absolute measure of prefer-
ences but rather the relative importance of men’s versus women’s.5
The ISSP interviews a single household respondent, sometimes the
female and sometimes the male, so models will be run separately for
the genders. As the division of labor is negotiated with a partner in
the household, only married respondents less than sixty-five years of
age will be selected. The age restriction is applied because persons
over sixty-five are more likely to be retired, at the end of a lifetime of
employment during which household patterns may have been estab-
lished based on the historical division of labor rather than on current
time allocations.
Only married persons are selected because while the ISSP asks for
couples who are “married or living as married,” the national survey
centers confirmed that only married persons were included in this
category. The rate of cohabitation has historically been much higher
in the former East Germany as compared with either West Germany
or the United States (Einhorn 1993; Ostner 1993), but in the last two
countries it is most often a prelude to marriage, not a stable family
state (Blossfeld 1995). Consequently, whether or not the couple
cohabited with each other prior to the marriage is included as a con-
trol variable in the model.
A scale score of responsibility for domestic tasks in East and West
German and U.S. married households will be regressed on individual
measures of gender ideology and relative resource and other control
variables with listwise deletion of missing data. Various imputations
indicate the substantive results appear to be robust, so the more
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conservative approach of listwise deletion is selected so as not to
reduce variance and inflate significance levels. Greenstein (1996) found
a significant interaction effect between wives’ and husbands’ ideology
and the division of household labor; types within a household cannot
be ascertained with the ISSP data because only one adult is inter-
viewed regarding their own attitudes. Instead, particular attention
will be paid to the extent to which the independent female and male
cross-sectional samples drawn for the ISSP appear complementary.
Dependent Variable
The scale measuring couples’ relative responsibility for domestic
tasks is derived from questions on who is normally responsible for
(1) caring for the sick, (2) doing laundry, (3) doing the grocery
shopping, (4) deciding what to have for dinner, and (5) doing small
repairs (reverse coded). In a traditional division of domestic labor,
the women would always do the first four tasks and the man would
always do small repairs.6 Factor analysis (results not shown) reveals
high loadings on a single factor for all but the fifth item, despite its
reverse coding. Consequently, the domestic responsibility scale is
created by summing responses across the four dominantly female
tasks and dividing by four, resulting in a scale ranging from one, a
traditional division of the unpaid labor where the woman is always
responsible for the tasks, to five, a nontraditional division where
the man is always responsible. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha on the scale
is 0.65 for West Germany, 0.55 for East Germany, and 0.70 for the
United States, indicating fairly high internal consistency.
Mean responses on the scale by gender and region are shown in
figure 1. The difference in women’s and men’s reports is significant
in West Germany and the United States but not East Germany.
Where there is a significant difference, men report a more nontradi-
tional sharing of the tasks than do the women, a result found in other
studies using U.S. couple reports within a household (see Press and
Townsley 1998). As anticipated, among women, East German women
report the most nontraditional sharing of domestic responsibility,
whereas West German women report the most traditional. U.S. men,
however, unexpectedly report the most nontraditional sharing of
domestic tasks of all the groups. The difference in gendered percep-
tions of who is responsible is also the greatest in the United States.
Whether relative resources and gender attitudes explain these differ-
ences will be tested within the model.
Independent Variables
Gender Ideology Scale. Evidence indicates that where individuals
hold a more traditional gender ideology, the division of domestic
10 of 27 ◆ Cooke
tasks is more traditional, and where individuals hold less traditional
gender ideology, the domestic division is also less traditional (Blair
and Lichter 1991; Presser 1994; Sanchez 1994). Fourteen questions
in the ISSP assess the degree to which respondents support the tradi-
tional division of labor (see table 1). Six questions are recoded so
that for all questions, a lower score indicates a more traditional gen-
der ideology, while a higher score reflects a less traditional one. The
fourteen measures are factor analyzed, with the factor loadings and
Cronbach’s alpha presented in table 2. Consistent across the coun-
tries are three general factors: Domestic, WorkingMom, and Eco-
nomic.7 The Domestic factor consists of those variables emphasizing
women’s responsibility in the domestic sphere and the traditional
division of labor: women want a home and child, housework satisfies
as much as a paid job, and the husband should earn the money while
the wife looks after the home. For West Germany, also loading high
on this factor is that a reversal of traditional gender roles is not good.
Cronbach’s alpha indicates that the first three variables are internally
consistent across the countries (Carmines and Zeller 1979).
The second factor, WorkingMom, consists of those four questions
assessing attitudes on how well women can balance paid employ-
ment with family. The internal consistency on this scale approaches
Figure 1. Responsibility for Domestic Tasks Scale Reports by Gender East, West
Germany and the United States.Married persons less than 65 years of age 1 = Wife
always responsible, 5 = Husband always responsible.
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0.70 across the countries. The internal consistency on the third factor-
based scale, Economic, which assesses the extent to which women
should contribute economically to the family and whether work pro-
vides women with independence, is lower at approximately 0.50 across
the countries.8
To improve measure reliability, a single scale is created using the
three consistent measures for Domestic and the four measures for
WorkingMom. The scale is formed by summing responses on the
seven variables and dividing by the number of variables so that each
scale ranges from one, most traditional, to five, most nontraditional.
These seven variables yield an alpha of 0.76 for West Germany, 0.77
for East Germany, and 0.77 for the United States, indicating very
high internal consistency (Carmines and Zeller 1979).
Control Variables
Control variables include relative resources, log of total household
income, age, children, whether the couple cohabited prior to the
Table 1. Gender attitude questions on the 1994 International Social Survey
Program
Note: (R) indicates reverse coding so that a higher score reflects more nontraditional
attitudes.
1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with 
her children as a mother who does not work. (R)
2. A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
4. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.
5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
6. Most women have to work these days to support their families. (R)
7. Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income. (R)
8. A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and 
family.
9. It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the family and the 
woman goes out to work.
10. Women should stay at home full-time when there is a child under school age 
(three-point scale: home full-time, work part-time, work full-time).
11. One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together. (R)
12. People who never have children lead empty lives.
13. A pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion for any reason 
whatsoever, if she chooses not to have the baby. (R)
14. Work is best for women’s independence. (R)
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marriage, whether either partner is previously divorced, and religious
service attendance. The first relative resource measure is an indicator
variable for when wives are not employed. This is to differentiate
effects between households with the traditional gendered division of
paid labor and households with varying divisions of paid labor. The
ISSP asks respondents about their own and their spouse’s labor force
status in terms of several possible categories. Persons reporting they
are a homemaker, in education, unemployed, or out of the labor
force are coded as not employed. Controlling for effects of the other
variables, women who are not employed are expected to have greater
responsibility for domestic tasks, as depicted by a negative coefficient
on this variable.
Most studies have found that the smaller the gap between
husbands’ and wives’ earnings, the more equal the division of house-
hold labor (Blair and Lichter 1991; Kamo 1991, 1994; Presser 1994;
Shelton and John 1996). Earnings are measured here with a variable
of the respondent’s earnings as a percentage of total household
income. A wage variable would have been preferred, but the ISSP
data do not include hours of work for either German region with
which to calculate hourly wages. On the other hand, the relative
earnings measure does provide a proxy of relative family economic
power. Women’s greater relative earnings are expected to predict a
more egalitarian division of responsibility for domestic tasks (a
positive coefficient in the wives’ models), whereas men’s greater
relative earnings are expected to predict a more traditional division
of domestic responsibility (a negative coefficient in the husbands’
models).
Educational attainment is often used as a measure of relative
resources. Some U.S. evidence indicates that men’s education level is
positively associated with their domestic participation (Brines 1993;
Presser 1994; South and Spitze 1994), while other studies find no
association (Kamo 1991; McAllister 1990) or that the effect disap-
pears once gender ideology is included (Kamo 1994). Women’s
greater educational attainment is associated with less time in domes-
tic tasks (Blair and Lichter 1991; Brines 1993; South and Spitze
1994) and is normally interpreted as an education effect on ideology.
Women’s education could also, however, reflect an indirect effect of
economic resources (controlled for in the model with the log of
household income variable) and the use of purchased domestic ser-
vices. In the model here, ideology is controlled for, and too few ISSP
respondents report relying on a third person for domestic tasks.
Education will be measured with a single indicator variable for when
the respondent has postsecondary education, against a referent of
secondary schooling or less.9
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Children have been found to increase women’s absolute and rela-
tive share of domestic tasks (Brines 1993; McAllister 1990; Presser
1994; Shelton and John 1996; South and Spitze 1994). This same
effect is expected here, indicated if the child measure predicts a more
traditional division of domestic responsibility (negative coefficient),
with the effect possibly greater in West Germany where wives have
been specifically charged with this responsibility. The presence of
children is measured with an indicator variable when there are addi-
tional persons in the household, against a referent of a two-person
household.10
Women’s employment and domestic activity patterns have histori-
cally varied across the life course as they adapt to having children,
with labor force participation rates higher early in adulthood, falling
during childbearing years, and rising again once children reach
school age. Consequently, age is modeled with three indicator vari-
ables: one where the respondent is less than thirty, one when s/he is
thirty to thirty-nine, and one for when s/he is fifty to sixty-five. The
referent is age forty to forty-nine, the prime labor force participation
years for both men and women.
An indicator variable is also included for when the couple cohab-
ited, against a referent of having not cohabited with the present
spouse prior to marriage. Batalova and Cohen (2002) found that
couples who cohabited prior to marriage have more egalitarian divi-
sions of domestic tasks than couples marrying directly.
Two variables control for prior marriages, one indicating if the
wife and one indicating if the husband was previously divorced,
against a referent of not being previously divorced. While some evi-
dence for the United States indicates that divorced men perform the
greatest amount of domestic tasks relative to other men (South and
Spitze 1994), Gupta (1999) finds that U.S. men’s domestic share
always declines when he is living with a woman.
Religious conceptions of family reinforce the traditional division
of labor, but the role of religion varies in the three policy contexts.
East German socialism discouraged religious attendance; West
German policy incorporated religious conceptions of family; and
there is a formal separation of church and state in the United States.
Two indicator variables are used to capture the strength of religious
conviction in each of the regions: one for persons attending religious
services monthly or several times a year and one for persons attend-
ing more frequently, against a referent of persons never attending.
More frequent religious service attendance is expected to predict a
more traditional division of domestic responsibility. It is not specu-
lated, however, how the different policy environments might alter
these effects.
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Results
Descriptive statistics are reported in table 3. Comparing women’s
and men’s responses suggests that the reporting is consistent in terms
of household characteristics and relative earnings, regardless of the
gender of the respondent. As would be expected in a male breadwin-
ner state, West German wife-respondents report that almost half of
them are out of the labor force, as compared with less than one-third
of East German or U.S. wives. Among husband-respondents, the per-
centage whose wives are reportedly out of the labor force is slightly
higher across the regions than reported by wife-respondents: 59 percent
in West Germany, 38 percent in East Germany, and 32 percent in the
United States.
Also as would be expected, a higher percentage of East German
couples report cohabiting before marriage than in the other two
regions, and U.S. couples are more likely to be in second marriages,
with about one-fifth reporting either the wife or husband was previ-
ously divorced. About half of the U.S. respondents report attending
religious services weekly or more frequently, whereas in the former
West Germany, the majority attend religious services monthly or sev-
eral times during the year. In the East German region, the majority of
respondents report they do not attend religious services.
Regression results predicting the division of domestic responsibil-
ity are presented in table 4. Two models are run for each gender
within each country. The first model contains the relative resource
and control variables. The second model adds the gender ideology
scale score to ascertain whether this, as a proxy for preferences, sig-
nificantly improves upon the relative resources model. The change in
the F statistic is significant for all groups except East German men
and U.S. women, although it is only marginally significant for East
German women. This supports that preferences, controlling for rela-
tive economic resources, are important predictors of the division of
domestic labor, although the relative significance varies in its cultural
context.
Only among U.S. men does having a wife out of the labor force
predict that he will do significantly less of the domestic tasks, once
controlling for the effects of the other variables. More consistent is
the effect of a respondent’s proportional earnings, except among East
German women. For the other genders and regions, the more a man
earns, the more traditional the division of domestic tasks, and the
more the woman earns, the less traditional the division of domestic
tasks. The size of this effect is roughly similar, with each percentage
point increase in income shifting the division of labor 0.003 (East
Germany) to 0.006 (United States) on the five-point scale. So
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although earnings prove statistically significant, their substantive
effects are quite modest, shifting the division of domestic responsibil-
ities less than one scale point where the respondent is the sole bread-
winner. In the case of female respondents, these results suggest that
when she is the primary breadwinner of the couple, the division of
domestic responsibilities is at best equal. These results are consistent
with other findings that couples “do” gender in domestic tasks to
reinforce masculine and feminine identities when the traditional eco-
nomic roles are reversed (Fenstermaker Berk 1985; Brines 1994;
Hochschild 1989; West and Zimmerman 1987).
Controlling for relative earnings, West German women and men
and U.S. men report that households with greater income have a
more traditional division of domestic tasks. The magnitude of the
income effect is approximately equal to—and in the opposite direc-
tion of—education effects. As found in other empirical studies, men
with college education report a more egalitarian division of domestic
responsibility. A similar effect is found for U.S. women respondents
after controlling for gender ideology, although this effect is just mar-
ginally significant. For East German and U.S. men, the significant
education effect persists after controlling for gender ideology,
whereas it attenuates for West German men.
The presence of children in the household predicts a more tradi-
tional division of domestic tasks for both West German genders and
for U.S. men, although in the latter case, the effect is marginally sta-
tistically significant. Age effects are also apparent in West Germany
and the United States. Controlling for the presence of children,
younger U.S. and German persons report a more nontraditional divi-
sion of domestic tasks than the referent group of persons in their for-
ties. For both West German genders only, being the oldest age group,
having grown up during the height of the pater familias rhetoric of
the Adenauer years, predicts a more traditional division.
Cohabitation and previous divorce effects are only significant
among West Germans. West German men who cohabited prior to
marriage report a significantly more nontraditional division of
domestic tasks, but West German women do not appear to concur.
When a West German woman has been previously divorced, how-
ever, she reports a more nontraditional division of domestic tasks,
whereas when a West German woman reports her husband has been
divorced, the division is more traditional. West German men report
no similar divorce effects for either themselves or their wives.
Attendance at religious services has significant effects in all three
regions but not across the genders. Both East and West German men
attending religious services weekly or more frequently are predicted
to have a more traditional division of domestic tasks, but attendance
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is insignificant for these regions’ wife-respondents. In contrast, U.S.
women attending religious services at any frequency are predicted to
have a more traditional division of domestic tasks, but U.S. husband-
respondents attending services report no similar effect. All of these
religion effects are controlling for attitudes, so some of the influence
of religion on reinforcing normative male and female roles appears to
be direct.
As noted at the beginning of this section, inclusion of the prefer-
ence measure significantly improves the model except among U.S.
women. The smallest difference between women’s and men’s coeffi-
cients on the preference measure is found in East Germany.11 These
results suggest that socialist policies can reduce at least some of the
gendered differences in the allocation of time to domestic labor,
although the aggregate data suggests that East German women still
retain primary responsibility. At the other end of the capitalist con-
tinuum, preferences are insignificant in predicting the division of
domestic labor among U.S. women but are highly significant among
U.S. men. The difference between the two U.S. genders is also the
only preference coefficient difference that reaches statistical signifi-
cance. Finally, preferences explain a significant amount of the varia-
tion in the division of domestic labor in West Germany for both men
and women, but the difference between the genders is not statistically
significant.
Summary and Conclusions
International Social Survey Program data have been used to com-
pare the effects of measures of individual agency—relative resources
and a proxy for preferences—on the gendered division of domestic
labor across, and whether women’s or men’s preferences dominate
within, differing sociopolitical contexts. The country cases of East
and West Germany and the United States were selected as varying the
degree of policy reliance on women’s unpaid work in the private
sphere.
Results reveal that while relative resources alter the division of
domestic labor across the three regions, women are still apt to
spend more time in domestic tasks than men. Preferences prove sig-
nificant for all but East German men and U.S. women, but the size
of these effects is modest. That preferences do not fully account for
the remaining variance in the division of domestic labor once con-
trolling for relative resources could support Hakim’s contention
that attitudes are at best weak measures of preferences. Alterna-
tively, these results could reflect that the gendered division of
domestic labor is structurally determined and cannot be explained
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away by individual factors. Differentiating between these two pos-
sible explanations requires that preference, not just attitude, measures
are incorporated in future cross-national social survey programs.
As would have been predicted by Marx, the division of domestic
labor is slightly more egalitarian among East German couples, and
East German women’s preferences are as important as men’s in pre-
dicting movements from this average. But the socialist structure by
no means eliminated gender differences in the home. In contrast, the
difference between U.S. women’s and men’s preference coefficients is
the only regional gender difference to reach statistical significance,
with U.S. men’s preferences being more important determinants of
the division of domestic labor than women’s. This suggests some
support for the dual-feminist claim that a purely capitalist structure
may exacerbate patriarchy.
In West Germany preferences explain a significant amount of the
variation in the division of domestic labor for both men and women,
but the difference between the genders is not statistically significant.
Thus, an explicitly patriarchal structure does not necessarily increase
the relative gender strength of preferences in determining the division
of domestic labor. This is not to say that the patriarchy reinforced in
West German policy is less effective at institutionalizing it, but its
effects are not reflected in gender preference differences. West German
women’s reinforced domestic responsibility is evident in significant
effects found for having children.
One benefit of explicit policy, however, is that it can explicitly be
challenged and changed. Evidence of this may be manifesting in the
strong secular effects toward more egalitarian domestic labor divi-
sions found for the younger West German persons as compared with
those oldest respondents growing up during the height of the male
breadwinner policy rhetoric. Whether explicitly nonpatriarchal pol-
icy in a capitalist society would have the desired effect in shifting the
division of domestic labor, or merely have patriarchal effects sub-
sumed within individual preferences, is unknown.
Clearly, however, the market alone does not ensure egalitarian
gender relations and may in fact exacerbate the nonmarket hierar-
chies. Further comparative research is needed to disentangle these
interwoven effects and where in our models they manifest.
NOTES
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policy on gender equity and equity effects on family outcomes. Her work
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has appeared in European Sociological Review and Journal of Marriage and
Family, and her article on “doing” gender in context is forthcoming in
American Journal of Sociology. She is currently working on a book compar-
ing policy effects on gender power and family outcomes in seven countries.
1. The Gender Empowerment Measure consists of the percentage of par-
liamentary seats held by women, the percentage of women in administrative
or managerial, as well as professional or technical positions, and women’s
share of earnings income.
2. Feminist or reformer concerns for women as mothers also played a
key role in U.S. policy, particularly at the end of the nineteenth and begin-
ning of the twentieth centuries. Orloff (1996) provides a review of the schol-
arship documenting this era. The discourse changed, however, with attempts
to eliminate marriage bars implemented during the Great Depression (Hobson
1993).
3. Calculated from the 1995 Statistical Abstract of the United States,
tables 637 and 677.
4. More information on the ISSP, including codebooks, is available at
http://www.issp.org (accessed 26 January 2006).
5. Comparing the relative importance of the measures to the genders
within each region also reduces the concern regarding response bias due to
social desirability that might vary across contexts.
6. One response category was “tasks done by third person,” although it
was unclear if this was hired assistance or other family members. Further, few
respondents answered in this way and whether third persons were used for
each of the tasks varied, so this category was recoded as missing. For the most
part, third persons were most likely to be used to conduct the small repairs.
7. Braun, Scott, and Alwin (1994) also derived three similar core factors
for East and West Germans using the 1988 ISSP, so these factors appear to
be stable across time. Using different data, the 1991 German General Social
Survey, they found only two factors, but the questions were phrased and
scaled differently than ISSP questions (Braun, Scott, and Alwin 1994).
8. While the Domestic, WorkingMom, and Economic factors are com-
mon to all three countries and explain about half the variance in responses
to the fourteen questions, both East German and U.S. responses each yield a
marginally significant, but not the same, fourth factor, displayed in the final
columns of table 2. For East Germany, the fourth factor consists of the ques-
tions regarding gender role reversal and whether having no children means
an empty life, although the internal consistency is very low. For the United
States, questions on legal abortion and whether having no children means an
empty life form a factor. While these fourth factors illustrate the unique cul-
tural aspects of gender attitudes in East Germany and the United States, they
are not comparable across the countries and have low internal consistency
and are excluded from the analyses.
9. Very few persons in the German regions report not completing sec-
ondary schooling, so a referent of less than secondary schooling could not be
used against which to compare effects of secondary schooling. The percentage
of U.S. persons without secondary schooling is more substantial, at around
10 percent.
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10. This is the best proxy for children available with the ISSP data across
the countries. Another variable asked for life course status in terms of how
many adults and children lived in the household, but missing data on this
variable were more extensive than on the variable used.
11. The relative size of effects is calculated as the difference in the
unstandardized coefficients divided by the standard error of this difference
(the square root of the sum of the squared standard errors of each coeffi-
cient). This difference can be statistically significant even if any individual
coefficient has not been shown to be statistically different from zero in pre-
dicting the dependent variable.
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